Modern C++ Programming

15. Debugging and Testing

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Feature Complete

AAAAND...
DONE!
UNIT TESTS
DOCUMENTATION
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UNIT TESTS

Debugging Overview

Is this a bug?

```
for (int i = 0; i <= (2^32) - 1; i++) {
```

> *“Software developers spend 35-50 percent of their time validating and debugging software. The cost of debugging, testing, and verification is estimated to account for 50-75 percent of the total budget of software development projects”*

from: John Regehr (on Twitter)

Errors, Defects, and Failures

- An **error** is a human mistake. *Errors* lead to *software defects*
- A **defects** is an unexpected behavior of the software (correctness, performance, etc.). *Defects* potentially lead to *software failures*
- A **failure** is an observable incorrect behavior

Cost of Software Defects



Cost of Software Defects 2/2

Some examples:

- **The Millennium Bug** (2000): $100 billion
- **The Morris Worm** (1988): $10 million (single student)
- **Ariane 5** (1996): $370 million
- **Knight's unintended trades** (2012): $440 million
- **Bitcoin exchange error** (2011): $1.5 million
- **Pentium FDIV Bug** (1994): $475 million
- **Boeing 737 MAX** (2019): $3.9 million

see also:

`11 of the most costly software errors in history`

`Historical Software Accidents and Errors`

`List of software bugs`

Types of Software Defects

Ordered by fix complexity, (time to fix):

(1) **Typos, Syntax, Formatting** (seconds)

(2) **Compilation Warnings/Errors** (seconds, minutes)

(3) **Logic, Arithmetic, Runtime Errors** (minutes, hours, days)

(4) **Resource Errors** (minutes, hours, days)

(5) **Accuracy Errors** (hours, days)

(6) **Performance Errors** (days)

(7) **Design Errors** (weeks, months)

Causes of Bugs

- *C++ is very error prone language*, see `60 terrible tips for a C++ developer`
- *Human behavior*, e.g. copying & pasting code is very common practice and can introduce subtle bugs → check the code carefully, deep understanding of its behavior

Program Errors

A **program error** is a set of conditions that produce an *incorrect result* or *unexpected behavior*, including performance regression, memory consumption, early termination, etc.

We can distinguish between two kind of errors:

Recoverable *Conditions that are not under the control of the program*. They indicate *"exceptional"* run-time conditions. e.g. file not found, bad allocation, wrong user input, etc.

Unrecoverable *It is a synonym of a bug*. It indicates a problem in the program logic. The program must terminate and be modified. e.g. out-of-bound, division by zero, etc.

A *recoverable* should be considered *unrecoverable* if it is extremely rare and difficult to handle, e.g. bad allocation due to out-of-memory error

Dealing with Software Defects

Software defects can be identified by:

Dynamic Analysis A *mitigation* strategy that acts on the runtime state of a program.

Techniques: Print, run-time debugging, sanitizers, fuzzing, unit test support, performance regression tests

Limitations: Infeasible to cover all program states

Static Analysis A *proactive* strategy that examines the source code for (potential) errors.

Techniques: Warnings, static analysis tool, compile-time checks

Limitations: Turing's undecidability theorem, exponential code paths

Assertions

Unrecoverable Errors and Assertions

Unrecoverable errors cannot be handled. They should be prevented by using *assertion* for ensuring *pre-conditions* and *post-conditions*

An **assertion** is a statement to detect a violated assumption. An assertion represents an *invariant* in the code

It can happen both at *run-time* (`assert`) and *compile-time* (`static_assert`). Run-time assertion failures should never be exposed in the normal program execution (e.g. release/public)

Assertion

```cpp
#include <cassert>      // <-- needed for "assert"
#include <cmath>        // std::is_finite
#include <type_traits> // std::is_arithmetic_v

template<typename T>
T sqrt(T value) {
    static_assert(std::is_arithmetic_v<T>,       // precondition
                  "T must be an arithmetic type");
    assert(std::is_finite(value) && value >= 0); // precondition
    int ret = ...                                // sqrt computation
    assert(std::is_finite(value) && ret >= 0 &&  // postcondition
          (ret == 0 || ret == 1 || ret < value));
    return ret;
}
```

Assertion

Assertions may slow down the execution. They can be disabled by defining the `NDEBUG` macro

```
#define NDEBUG // or with the flag "-DNDEBUG"
```

Additionally, MSVC defines the `_DEBUG` macro when the `/MTd` or `/MDd` flags are provided to select the debug version of the C run-time library

Assertion Enhancements 1/2

boost.org/libs/assert provides an enhanced version of `assert` to help the debugging process

The library provides the `BOOST_ASSERT(expr)` macro which is mapped to the following function (to implement and customize)

```
void boost::assertion_failed(
                      const char* expr,     // failed expression
                      const char* function, // function name of the failed assertion
                      const char* file,     // file name of the failed assertion
                      long        line);    // line number of the failed assertion
```

Assertion Enhancements 2/2

boost.org/libs/stacktrace allows to print the stacktrace for a given function call

`boost::stacktrace::stacktrace()` returns a string with the stacktrace

This function can be combined with `boost::assertion_failed`, exception handling, or signal handling to enhance debugging information

```
0# bar(int) at /path/to/source/file.cpp:70
1# bar(int) at /path/to/source/file.cpp:70
2# bar(int) at /path/to/source/file.cpp:70
3# bar(int) at /path/to/source/file.cpp:70
4# main at /path/to/main.cpp:93
5# __libc_start_main in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
6# _start
```

Execution Debugging

Execution Debugging (gdb) 1/2

How to compile and run for debugging:

```
g++ -O0 -g [-g3] <program.cpp> -o program
gdb [--args] ./program <args...>
```

-O0 Disable any code optimization for helping the debugger. It is implicit for most compilers

-g Enable debugging

- stores the *symbol table information* in the executable (mapping between assembly and source code lines)
- for some compilers, it may disable certain optimizations
- slow down the compilation phase and the execution

-g3 Produces enhanced debugging information, e.g. macro definitions. Available for most compilers. Suggested instead of **-g**

Execution Debugging (gdb) 2/2

Additional flags:

`-ggdb3` Generate specific debugging information for gdb. Equivalent to -g3 with gcc

`-fno-omit-frame-pointer` Do not remove information that can be used to reconstruct the call stack

`-fasynchronous-unwind-tables` Allow precise stack unwinding

gdb - Breakpoints

Command	Abbr.	Description
breakpoint <*file*>:<*line*>	**b**	insert a breakpoint in a specific line
breakpoint <*function_name*>	**b**	insert a breakpoint in a specific function
breakpoint <*ref*> **if** <*condition*>	**b**	insert a breakpoint with a conditional statement
delete	**d**	delete all breakpoints or watchpoints
delete <*breakpoint_number*>	**d**	delete a specific breakpoint
clear [*function_name/line_number*]		delete a specific breakpoint
enable/disable <*breakpoint_number*>		enable/disable a specific breakpoint
info breakpoints	**info b**	list all active breakpoints

gdb - Watchpoints / Catchpoints

Command	Abbr.	Description
watch <*expression*>		stop execution when the value of expression changes (variable, comparison, etc.)
rwatch <*variable/location*>		stop execution when variable/location is read
delete <*watchpoint_number*>	**d**	delete a specific watchpoint
info watchpoints		list all active watchpoints
catch throw		stop execution when an *exception* is thrown

gdb - Control Flow

Command	Abbr.	Description
`run` [args]	`r`	run the program
`continue`	`c`	continue the execution
`finish`	`f`	continue until the end of the current function
`step`	`s`	execute next line of code (follow function calls)
`next`	`n`	execute next line of code
`until` <*program_point*>		continue until reach line number, function name, address, etc.
`CTRL+C`		stop the execution (not quit)
`quit`	`q`	exit
`help` [<*command*>]	`h`	show help about command

`gdb` - Stack and Info

Command	Abbr.	Description
`list`	`l`	print code
`list` <*function or #start,#end*>	`l`	print function/range code
`up`	`u`	move up in the call stack
`down`	`d`	move down in the call stack
`backtrace [full]`	`bt`	prints stack backtrace (call stack) [local vars]
`info args`		print current function arguments
`info locals`		print local variables
`info variables`		print all variables
`info` <*breakpoints/watchpoints/registers*>		show information about program breakpoints/watchpoints/registers

gdb - Print

Command	Abbr.	Description
`print` <*variable*>	`p`	print variable
`print/h` <*variable*>	`p/h`	print variable in hex
`print/nb` <*variable*>	`p/nb`	print variable in binary (n bytes)
`print/w` <*address*>	`p/w`	print address in binary
`p /s` <*char array/address*>		print `char` array
`p *array_var@n`		print n array elements
`p (int[4])`<*address*>		print four elements of type `int`
`p *(char**)&`<*std::string*>		print `std::string`

gdb - Disassemble

Command	Description
disassemble <*function_name*>	disassemble a specified function
disassemble <0xStart,0xEnd addr>	disassemble function range
nexti <*variable*>	execute next line of code (follow function calls)
stepi <*variable*>	execute next line of code
x/nfu <*address*>	examine address n number of elements, f format (**d**: int, **f**: float, etc.), u data size (**b**: byte, **w**: word, etc.)

`std::breakpoint`

C++26 provides the `<debugging>` library, which allows interaction with a debugger directly from the source code, without relying on platform-specific intrinsic instructions

- `breakpoint()` attempts to temporarily halt the execution of the program and transfer control to the debugger. The behavior is implementation-defined
- `breakpoint_if_debugging()` halts the execution if a debugger is detected
- `is_debugger_present()` returns `true` if the program is executed under a debugger, `false` otherwise

gdb - Notes

The debugger automatically stops when:

- breakpoint (by using the debugger)
- assertion fail
- segmentation fault
- trigger software breakpoint (e.g. SIGTRAP on Linux)
  `github.com/scottt/debugbreak`

Full story: `www.yolinux.com/TUTORIALS/GDB-Commands.html` (it also contains a script to *de-referencing* STL Containers)

`gdb reference card V5 link`

Memory Debugging

Memory Vulnerabilities 1/3

> *“70% of all the vulnerabilities in Microsoft products are memory safety issues"*
>
> ***Matt Miller**, Microsoft Security Engineer*

> *“Chrome: 70% of all security bugs are memory safety issues"*
>
> ***Chromium Security Report***

> *“you can expect at least 65% of your security vulnerabilities to be caused by memory unsafety"*
>
> ***What science can tell us about C and C++’s security***

`Microsoft: 70% of all security bugs are memory safety issues`

`Chrome: 70% of all security bugs are memory safety issues`

`What science can tell us about C and C++’s security`

Memory Vulnerabilities 2/3

> *“Memory Unsafety in Apple’s OS represents 66.3%- 88.2% of all the vulnerabilities"*

> *“Out of bounds (OOB) reads/writes comprise ∼70% of all the vulnerabilities in Android"*
>
> ***Jeff Vander****, Google, Android Media Team*

> *“Memory corruption issues are the root-cause of 68% of listed CVEs"*
>
> ***Ben Hawkes****, Google, Project Zero*

`Memory Unsafety in Apple’s Operating Systems`

`Google Security Blog: Queue the Hardening Enhancements`

`Google Project Zero`

Memory Vulnerabilities 2/2

Terms like *buffer overflow*, *race condition*, *page fault*, *null pointer*, *stack exhaustion*, *heap exhaustion/corruption*, *use-after-free*, or *double free* – all describe ***memory safety vulnerabilities***

Mitigation:

- Run-time check
- Static analysis
- Avoid unsafe language constructs

valgrind

valgrind is a tool suite to automatically detect many memory management and threading bugs

How to install the last version:

```
$ wget ftp://sourceware.org/pub/valgrind/valgrind-3.21.tar.bz2
$ tar xf valgrind-3.21.tar.bz2
$ cd valgrind-3.21
$ ./configure --enable-lto
$ make -j 12
$ sudo make install
$ sudo apt install libc6-dbg #if needed
```

some linux distributions provide the package through `apt install valgrid`, but it could be an old version

valgrind 2/9

Basic usage:

- compile with `-g`

-
  ```
  $ valgrind ./program <args...>
  ```

Output example 1:

```
==60127== Invalid read of size 4             !!out-of-bound access
==60127==    at 0x100000D9E: f(int) (main.cpp:86)
==60127==    by 0x100000C22: main (main.cpp:40)
==60127==  Address 0x10042c148 is 0 bytes after a block of size 40 alloc'd
==60127==    at 0x1000161EF: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:236)
==60127==    by 0x100000C88: f(int) (main.cpp:75)
==60127==    by 0x100000C22: main (main.cpp:40)
```

valgrind 3/9

Output example 2:

```
!!memory leak
==19182== 40 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 1 of 1
==19182==    at 0x1B8FF5CD: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:130)
==19182==    by 0x8048385: f (main.cpp:5)
==19182==    by 0x80483AB: main (main.cpp:11)

==60127== HEAP SUMMARY:
==60127==     in use at exit: 4,184 bytes in 2 blocks
==60127==   total heap usage: 3 allocs, 1 frees, 4,224 bytes allocated
==60127==
==60127== LEAK SUMMARY:
==60127==    definitely lost: 128 bytes in 1 blocks    !!memory leak
==60127==    indirectly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
==60127==      possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
==60127==    still reachable: 4,184 bytes in 2 blocks  !!not deallocated
```

valgrind

Memory leaks are divided into four categories:

- *Definitely lost*
- *Indirectly lost*
- *Still reachable*
- *Possibly lost*

When a program terminates, it releases all heap memory allocations. Despite this, leaving memory leaks is considered a *bad practice* and *makes the program unsafe* with respect to multiple internal iterations of a functionality. If a program has memory leaks for a single iteration, is it safe for multiple iterations?

A **robust program** prevents any memory leak even when abnormal conditions occur

valgrind 5/9

Definitely lost indicates blocks that are *not deleted at the end of the program* (return from the `main()` function). The common case is local variables pointing to newly allocated heap memory

```
void f() {
    int* y = new int[3];  // 12 bytes definitely lost
}

int main() {
    int* x = new int[10]; // 40 bytes definitely lost
    f();
}
```

valgrind 6/9

Indirectly lost indicates blocks pointed by other heap variables that are not deleted. The common case is global variables pointing to newly allocated heap memory

```
struct A {
    int* array;
};

int main() {
    A* x     = new A;      //  8 bytes definitely lost
    x->array = new int[4]; // 16 bytes indirectly lost
}
```

valgrind 7/9

Still reachable indicates blocks that are *not deleted but they are still reachable at the end of the program*

```cpp
int* array;

int main() {
    array = new int[3];
}
// 12 bytes still reachable (global static class could delete it)
```

```cpp
#include <cstdlib>
int main() {
    int* array = new int[3];
    std::abort();                // early abnormal termination
    // 12 bytes still reachable
    ... // maybe it is delete here
}
```

valgrind 8/9

Possibly lost indicates blocks that are still reachable but pointer arithmetic makes the deletion more complex, or even not possible

```cpp
#include <cstdlib>
int main() {
    int* array = new int[3];
    array++;                      // pointer arithmetic
    std::abort();                 // early abnormal termination
    // 12 bytes still reachable
    ... // maybe it is delete here but you should be able
        // to revert pointer arithmetic
}
```

valgrind 9/9

Advanced flags:

- `-leak-check=full` print details for each “`definitely lost`" or “`possibly lost`" block, including where it was allocated
- `-show-leak-kinds=all` to combine with `-leak-check=full`. Print all leak kinds
- `-track-fds=yes` list open file descriptors on exit (not closed)
- `-track-origins=yes` tracks the origin of uninitialized values (very slow execution)

```
valgrind --leak-check=full --show-leak-kinds=all
         --track-fds=yes --track-origins=yes ./program <args...>
```

Track stack usage:

```
valgrind --tool=drd --show-stack-usage=yes ./program <args...>
```

Hardening Techniques

References

- Compiler Options Hardening Guide for C and C++ [March, 2024]
- Hardened mode of standard library implementations

Compile-time Stack Usage

- `-Wstack-usage=<byte-size>` Warn if the stack usage of a function might exceed byte-size. The computation done to determine the stack usage is conservative (no VLA)
- `-fstack-usage` Makes the compiler output stack usage information for the program, on a per-function basis
- `-Wvla` Warn if a variable-length array is used in the code
- `-Wvla-larger-than=<byte-size>` Warn for declarations of variable-length arrays whose size is either unbounded, or bounded by an argument that allows the array size to exceed byte-size bytes

`Use compiler flags for stack protection in GCC and Clang`

Compile-time Stack Protection

- `-Wtrampolines` Check whether the compiler generates trampolines for pointers to nested functions which may interfere with stack virtual memory protection
- `-Wl,-z,noexecstack` Enable data execution prevention by marking stack memory as non-executable

Run-time Stack Usage

- `-fstack-clash-protection` Enables run-time checks for variable-size stack allocation validity
- `-fstack-protector-strong` Enables run-time checks for stack-based buffer overflows using strong heuristic
- `-fstack-protector-all` Enables run-time checks for stack-based buffer overflows for all functions

Standard C Library Hardening 1/2

Harderning the *standard C library* `libc` allows to checks for buffer overflows of fundamental C functions

`_FORTIFY_SOURCE` **macro**: enable buffer overflow checks for the following functions:

`memcpy` , `mempcpy` , `memmove` , `memset` , `strcpy` , `stpcpy` , `strncpy` , `strcat` , `strncat` , `sprintf` , `vsprintf` , `snprintf` , `vsnprintf` , `gets` .

Recent compilers (e.g. GCC 12+, Clang 9+) allow detects buffer overflows with enhanced coverage, e.g. dynamic pointers, with `_FORTIFY_SOURCE=3` *

*GCC's new fortification level: The gains and costs

Standard C Library Hardening 2/2

```cpp
#include <cstring> // std::memset
#include <string>  // std::stoi

int main(int argc, char** argv) {
    int  size = std::stoi(argv[1]);
    char buffer[24];
    std::memset(buffer, 0xFF, size);
}
```

```
$ gcc -O1 -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE program.cpp -o program
$ ./program 12 # OK
$ ./program 32 # Wrong
$ *** buffer overflow detected ***: ./program terminated
```

Standard C++ Library Hardening

The standard C++ library provides run-time precondition checks for library calls, such as bounds-checks for strings (`std::string`, `std::string_view`) and containers (`std::vector`, `std::span`, `std::optional`, etc.), null-pointer checks, etc.

Adoption of standard C++ library harderning led to a 30% reduction in segmentation fault rate in production code at Google at the cost of only 0.3% performance slowdown. This technique would prevent 1,000 to 2,000 new bugs yearly



Moving average of segfaults across our fleet over time, before and after enablement.

Standard C++ Library Hardening 2/2

Enable standard c++ library assertions:

GCC	`_GLIBCXX_ASSERTIONS`	(libstdc++)
LLVM	`_LIBCPP_HARDENING_MODE=<Hardening Level>`	(libc++)

`<Hardening Level>`:

`_LIBCPP_HARDENING_MODE_FAST`	Lightweight security-critical checks
`_LIBCPP_HARDENING_MODE_EXTENSIVE`	Non-security-critical lightweight checks
`_LIBCPP_HARDENING_MODE_DEBUG`	Enables all the available checks in the library

C++26 requires the option to enable C++ standard library hardening `P3471`

Safe Buffers

Clang can be used to harden C++ code against buffer overflows. The technique enforces the usage of standard *containers* and *views* instead of raw pointers `std::array`, `std::vector`, `std::string`, `std::span`, `std::string_view`

Compiler flags:

- **`-Wunsafe-buffer-usage`**: emit a warning for any operation applied to a raw pointer: array indexing, pointer arithmetic, bounds-unsafe standard C functions such as `std::memcpy()`, smart pointer operations
- **`-D_LIBCPP_HARDENING_MODE=_LIBCPP_HARDENING_MODE_FAST`**: enforce bounds-safe containers and views

Undefined Behavior Protections 1/2

- `-fno-strict-overflow` Prevent code optimization (code elimination) due to signed integer undefined behavior

- `-fwrapv` Signed integer has the same semantic of unsigned integer, with a well-defined wrap-around behavior

- `-fno-strict-aliasing` Strict aliasing means that two objects with the same memory address are not same if they have a different type, undefined behavior otherwise. The flag disables this constraint

Undefined Behavior Protections

- `-fno-delete-null-pointer-checks` NULL pointer dereferencing is undefined behavior and the compiler can assume that it never happens. The flag disable this optimization

- `-ftrivial-auto-var-init[=<hex pattern>]` Ensures that default initialization initializes variables with a fixed 1-byte pattern. Explicit uninitialized variables requires the `[[uninitialized]]` attribute

Control Flow Protections

- `-fcf-protection=full` Enable control flow protection to counter Return Oriented Programming (ROP) and Jump Oriented Programming (JOP) attacks on many x86 architectures

- `-mbranch-protection=standard` Enable branch protection to counter Return Oriented Programming (ROP) and Jump Oriented Programming (JOP) attacks on AArch64

Other Run-time Checks

- `-fPIE -pie` Position-Independent Executable enables the support for address space layout randomization, which makes exploits more difficult
- `-Wl,-z,relro,-z,now` Prevents modification of the Global Offset Table (locations of functions from dynamically linked libraries) after the program startup
- `-Wl,-z,nodlopen` Restrict `dlopen(3)` calls to shared objects

Sanitizers

Address Sanitizer

Sanitizers are compiler-based instrumentation components to perform *dynamic* analysis

Sanitizers are used during development and testing to discover and diagnose memory misuse bugs and potentially dangerous undefined behavior

Sanitizers are implemented in **`Clang`** (from 3.1), **`gcc`** (from 4.8) and **`Xcode`**

Project using Sanitizers:

- Chromium
- Firefox
- Linux kernel
- Android

Address Sanitizer

`Address Sanitizer` is a memory error detector

- heap/*stack*/*global* out-of-bounds
- memory leaks
- use-after-free, use-after-return, use-after-scope
- double-free, invalid free
- initialization order bugs

* Similar to `valgrind` but faster (50X slowdown)

```
clang++ -O1 -g -fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer <program>
```

`-O1` disable inlining

`-g` generate symbol table

- `github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizer`
- `gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Instrumentation-Options.html`

Leak Sanitizer

`LeakSanitizer` is a run-time *memory leak* detector

- integrated into `AddressSanitizer`, can be used as standalone tool
* almost no performance overhead until the very end of the process

```
g++     -O1 -g -fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer <program>
clang++ -O1 -g -fsanitize=leak -fno-omit-frame-pointer <program>
```

- `github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizerLeakSanitizer`
- `gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Instrumentation-Options.html`

Memory Sanitizers

`Memory Sanitizer` is a detector of *uninitialized* reads

- stack/heap-allocated memory read before it is written
* Similar to `valgrind` but faster (3X slowdown)

```
clang++ -O1 -g -fsanitize=memory -fno-omit-frame-pointer <program>
```

`-fsanitize-memory-track-origins=2`
track origins of uninitialized values

Note: not compatible with Address Sanitizer

- `github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/MemorySanitizer`
- `gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Instrumentation-Options.html`

Undefined Behavior Sanitizer

`UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer` is an *undefined behavior* detector

- signed integer overflow, floating-point types overflow, enumerated not in range
- out-of-bounds array indexing, misaligned address
- divide by zero
- etc.

* Not included in `valgrind`

```
clang++ -O1 -g -fsanitize=undefined -fno-omit-frame-pointer <program>
```

gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Instrumentation-Options.html

Undefined Behavior Sanitizer

`-fsanitize=<options>`:

`undefined` All of the checks other than `float-divide-by-zero`, `unsigned-integer-overflow`, `implicit-conversion`, `local-bounds` and the `nullability-*` group of checks

`float-divide-by-zero` Undefined behavior in C++, but defined by Clang and IEEE-754

`integer` Checks for undefined or suspicious integer behavior (e.g. unsigned integer overflow)

`implicit-conversion` Checks for suspicious behavior of implicit conversions

`local-bounds` Out of bounds array indexing, in cases where the array bound can be statically determined

`nullability` Checks passing `null` as a function parameter, assigning `null` to an lvalue, and returning `null` from a function

Sampling-Based Sanitizer

`GWPSan` is a framework to implement low-overhead sampling-based dynamic binary instrumentation, designed for detecting various bugs where more expensive dynamic analysis would otherwise not be feasible

- `tsan` (thread-sanitizer) data races
- `uar` use-after-return bugs
- `lmsan` Uninitialized variables

```
clang++ -fexperimental-sanitize-metadata=atomics,uar <program>
```

Sanitizers vs. Valgrind

Bug	Valgrind detection	ASan detection
Uninitialized memory read	Yes	No *
Write overflow on heap	Yes	Yes
Write overflow on stack	No	Yes
Read overflow on heap	Yes	Yes
Read underflow on heap	Yes	Yes
Read overflow on stack	No	Yes
Use-after-free	Yes	Yes
Use-after-return	No	Yes
Double-free	Yes	Yes
Memory leak	Yes	Yes
Undefined behavior	No	No **



Debugging Summary

How to Debug Common Errors

Segmentation fault

- gdb, valgrind, sanitizers
- Segmentation fault when just entered in a function → stack overflow

Double free or corruption

- gdb, valgrind, sanitizers

Infinite execution

- gdb + (CTRL + C)

Incorrect results

- valgrind + assertion + gdb + sanitizers

Compiler Warnings

Compiler Warnings - GCC and Clang

Enable specific warnings:

```
g++ -W<warning> <args...>
```

Disable specific warnings:

```
g++ -Wno-<warning> <args...>
```

Common warning flags to minimize accidental mismatches:

`-Wall` Enables many standard warnings (∼50 warnings)

`-Wextra` Enables some extra warning flags that are not enabled by `-Wall` (∼15 warnings)

`-Wpedantic` Issue all the warnings demanded by strict ISO C/C++

Enable ALL warnings, only `clang`: `-Weverything`

Compiler Warnings - MSVC

Enable specific warnings:

```
cl.exe /W<level><warning_id> <args...>
```

Disable specific warnings:

```
cl.exe /We<warning_id> <args...>
```

Common warning flags to minimize accidental mismatches:

`/W1`	Severe warnings
`/W2`	Significant warnings
`/W3`	Production quality warnings
`/W4`	Informational warnings
`/Wall`	All warnings

The Impact of Compiler Warnings on Code Quality 2/2



ID	GCC / Clang Warning Flags
N	No warnings used
A	`-Wall`
AE	`-Wall -Wextra`
AEP	`-Wall -Wextra -Wpedantic`
AEP+	`-Wall -Wextra -Wpedantic -Werror`



	N		A		AE		AEP		AEP+	
Quality Measures	**Mean**	**Std.Dev.**	**Mean**	**Std.Dev.**	**Mean**	**Std.Dev.**	**Mean**	**Std.Dev.**	**Mean**	**Std.Dev.**
Bugs	0.97	0.88	0.94	0.94	0.65	0.89	0.37	0.92	0.42	0.89
Critical Issues	23.97	19.74	19.29	20.65	17.63	20.04	16.12	20.5	11.89	20.04
Vulnerabilities	0.006	0.014	0.022	0.016	0.012	0.014	0.004	0.015	0.001	0.014
Code Smells	71.45	79.07	72.72	82.24	60.66	79.70	87.95	81.60	54.31	79.70
Technical Debt Ratio	2.16	2.06	2.05	2.13	1.70	2.09	2.12	2.13	1.40	2.08

low value → higher code quality

Static Analysis

Overview

Static analysis is the process of source code examination to find potential issues

Benefits of static code analysis:

- Problem identification before the execution
- Analyze the program outside the execution environment
- The analysis is independent of the run-time tests
- Enforce code quality and compliance by ensuring that the code follows specific rules and standards
- Identify security vulnerabilities

Compiler-Provided Static Analyzers

The `Clang Static Analyzer` (LLVM suite) finds bugs by reasoning about the semantics of code (may produce false positives)

```
scan-build make
```

The `GCC Static Analyzer` can diagnose various kinds of problems in C/C++ code at compile-time (e.g. double-free, use-after-free, stdio related, etc.) by adding the `-fanalyzer` flag

The `MSVC Static Analyzer` Enables code analysis and control options (e.g. double-free, use-after-free, stdio related, etc.) by adding the `/analyze` flag

Open-Source Static Analyzers 1/2

cppcheck provides code analysis to detect bugs, undefined behavior and dangerous coding construct. The goal is to detect only real errors in the code (i.e. have very few false positives)

```
cppcheck --enable=warning,performance,style,portability,information,error <file>
```

```
cmake -DCMAKE_EXPORT_COMPILE_COMMANDS=ON .
cppcheck --enable=<enable_flags> --project=compile_commands.json
```

Debian source code test case:

- Buffer overflows → ∼ 1 900
- Uninitialized variables → ∼ 16 000
- Null pointer dereference → ∼ 8 000
- Number of "error" → 94 275

Building Cppcheck - What We Learned from 17 Years of Development, *Daniel Marjamäki*

Open-Source Static Analyzers 2/2

`FBInfer` is a static analysis tool (also available online) to checks for null pointer dereferencing, memory leak, coding conventions, unavailable APIs, etc.

`Nasa IKOS` (Inference Kernel for Open Static Analyzers) is a static analyzer for C/C++ based on the theory of Abstract Interpretation.

Proprietary Static Analyzers 1/2

PVS-Studio is a high-quality *proprietary* (free for open source projects) static code analyzer supporting C, C++

Customers: IBM, Intel, Adobe, Microsoft, Nvidia, Bosh, IdGames, EpicGames, etc.

SonarSource is a static analyzer which inspects source code for bugs, code smells, and security vulnerabilities for multiple languages (C++, Java, etc.)

SonarLint plugin is available for Visual Code, Visual Studio Code, Eclipse, and IntelliJ IDEA

Customers: Amazon AWS, Facebook/Ocolus, Instagram, Whatapp, Mozilla, Spotify, Uber, Sky, etc.

Proprietary Static Analyzers 2/2

DEEPCODE **`deepCode`** ↗ is an AI-powered code review system, with machine learning systems trained on billions of lines of code from open-source projects

Available for Visual Studio Code, Sublime, IntelliJ IDEA, and Atom

see also: `A curated list of static analysis tool`

Static Analysis Tools Effectiveness

Evaluation over a dataset which comprises 319 real-world vulnerabilities from 815 vulnerability-contributing commits (VCCs) in 92 C and C++ projects.



Code Testing

Code Testing



see `Case Study 4: The $440 Million Software Error at Knight Capital`

from: Kat Maddox (on Twitter)

Code Testing

"A QA engineer walks into a bar.

Orders a beer, 0 beers, 99999999999 beers, a lizard, -1 bear and ueicbksjdhd.

The first real customer walks in and ask where the bathroom is. The bar bursts into flames."

Code Testing

Unit Test A *unit* is the smallest piece of code that can be logically isolated in a system. *Unit test* refers to the verification of a *unit*. It supposes the full knowledge of the code under testing (*white-box* testing)
Goals: meet specifications/requirements, fast development/debugging

Functional Test Output validation instead of the internal structure (*black-box* testing)
Goals: performance, regression (same functionalities of previous version), stability, security (e.g. sanitizers), composability (e.g. integration test)

Unit Testing 1/3

Unit testing involves breaking your program into pieces, and subjecting each piece to a series of tests

Unit testing should observe the following key features:

- **Isolation**: Each unit test should be *independent* and avoid external interference from other parts of the code
- **Automation**: Non-user interaction, easy to run, and manage
- **Small Scope**: Unit tests focus on small portions of code or specific functionalities, making it easier to identify bugs

Popular C++ Unit testing frameworks:

`catch`, `doctest`, `Google Test`, `CppUnit`, `Boost.Test`

Unit Testing



Unit Testing 3/3





The statistic that a quarter of developers aren’t writing unit tests freaks me out. I don’t feel strongly about how you express those or what framework you use, but we all do need to be writing tests.

Titus Winters
Principal Engineer at Google

Test-Driven Development (TDD)

Unit testing is often associated with the **Test-Driven Development (TDD)** methodology. The practice involves the definition of *automated functional tests* before implementing the functionality

The process consists of the following steps:

1. Write a test for a new functionality
2. Write the minimal code to pass the test
3. Improve/Refactor the code iterating with the test verification
4. Go to 1.

Test-Driven Development (TDD) - Main advantages

- **Software design**. Strong focus on interface definition, expected behavior, specifications, and requirements before working at lower level
- **Maintainability/Debugging Cost** Small, incremental changes allow you to catch bugs as they are introduced. Later refactoring or the introduction of new features still rely on well-defined tests
- **Understandable behavior**. New user can learn how the system works and its properties from the tests
- **Increase confidence**. Developers are more confident that their code will work as intended because it has been extensively tested
- **Faster development**. Incremental changes, high confidence, and automation make it easy to move through different functionalities or enhance existing ones

catch 1/2

Catch2 is a multi-paradigm test framework for C++

Catch2 features

- Header only and no external dependencies
- Assertion macro
- Floating point tolerance comparisons

Basic usage:

- Create the test program
- Run the test

```
$ ./test_program [<TestName>]
```

- github.com/catchorg/Catch2
- The Little Things: Testing with Catch2

```
#define CATCH_CONFIG_MAIN  // This tells Catch to provide a main()
#include "catch.hpp"       // only do this in one cpp file

unsigned Factorial(unsigned number) {
    return number <= 1 ? number : Factorial(number - 1) * number;
}

"Test description and tag name"
TEST_CASE( "Factorials are computed", "[Factorial]" ) {
    REQUIRE( Factorial(1) == 1 );
    REQUIRE( Factorial(2) == 2 );
    REQUIRE( Factorial(3) == 6 );
    REQUIRE( Factorial(10) == 3628800 );
}

float floatComputation() { ... }
```

Code Coverage 1/3

Code coverage is a measure used to describe the degree to which the source code of a program is executed when a particular execution/test suite runs

`gcov` and `llvm-profdata/llvm-cov` are tools used in conjunction with compiler instrumentation (`gcc`, `clang`) to interpret and visualize the raw code coverage generated during the execution

`gcovr` and `lcov` are utilities for managing **`gcov/llvm-cov`** at higher level and generating code coverage results

Step for code coverage:

- Compile with `-coverage` flag (objects + linking)
- Run the program / test
- Visualize the results with **`gcovr`**, **`llvm-cov`**, **`lcov`**

Code Coverage 2/3

program.cpp:

```
#include <iostream>
#include <string>

int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
    int value = std::stoi(argv[1]);
    if (value % 3 == 0)
        std::cout << "first\n";
    if (value % 2 == 0)
        std::cout << "second\n";
}
```

```
$ gcc -g --coverage program.cpp -o program
$ ./program 9
first
$ gcovr -r --html --html-details <path>  # generate html
# or
```

Code Coverage

```
    1:    4:int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
    1:    5:    int value = std::stoi(argv[1]);
    1:    6:    if (value % 3 == 0)
    1:    7:        std::cout << "first\n";
    1:    8:    if (value % 2 == 0)
#####:    9:        std::cout << "second\n";
    4:   10:}
```



			Hit	Total	Coverage
Current view:	top level - /home/ubuntu/workspace/prove				
Test:	coverage.info	Lines:	6	7	85.7 %
Date:	2018-02-09	Functions:	3	3	100.0 %

Filename	Line Coverage ⬍			Functions ⬍	
program.cpp	▆▆▆▆▆▆▁	85.7 %	6 / 7	100.0 %	3 / 3



			Hit	Total	Coverage
Current view:	top level - home/ubuntu/workspace/prove - program.cpp (source / functions)				
Test:	coverage.info	Lines:	6	7	85.7 %
Date:	2018-02-09	Functions:	3	3	100.0 %

```
          Line data    Source code
       1               : #include <iostream>
       2               : #include <string>
       3               :
       4             1 : int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
       5             1 :     int value = std::stoi(argv[1]); // convert to int
       6             1 :     if (value % 3 == 0)
       7             1 :         std::cout << "first";
       8             1 :     if (value % 2 == 0)
```

Coverage-Guided Fuzz Testing

A **fuzzer** is a specialized tool that tracks which areas of the code are reached, and generates *mutations* on the corpus of input data in order to *maximize* the code coverage

LibFuzzer is the library provided by LLVM and feeds fuzzed inputs to the library via a specific fuzzing entrypoint

The *fuzz target function* accepts an array of bytes and does something interesting with these bytes using the API under test:

```
extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* Data,
                                      size_t         Size) {
  DoSomethingInterestingWithMyAPI(Data, Size);
  return 0;
}
```

Code Quality

Linters - `clang-tidy` 1/2

lint: The term was derived from the name of the undesirable bits of fiber

`clang-tidy` provides an extensible framework for diagnosing and fixing typical *programming errors*, like *style violations*, *interface misuse*, or *bugs* that can be deduced via static analysis

```
$ cmake -DCMAKE_EXPORT_COMPILE_COMMANDS=ON .
$ clang-tidy -p .
```

`clang-tidy` searches the configuration file `.clang-tidy` file located in the closest parent directory of the input file

`clang-tidy` is included in the LLVM suite

Linters - clang-tidy 2/2

Coding Guidelines:

- CERT Secure Coding Guidelines
- C++ Core Guidelines
- High Integrity C++ Coding Standard

Supported Code Conventions:

- Fuchsia
- Google
- LLVM

Bug Related:

- Android related
- Boost library related
- Misc
- Modernize
- Performance
- Readability
- clang-analyzer checks
- bugprone code constructors

.clang-tidy

```
Checks: 'android-*,boost-*,bugprone-*,cert-*,cppcoreguidelines-*,
clang-analyzer-*,fuchsia-*,google-*,hicpp-*,llvm-*,misc-*,modernize-*,
performance-*,readability-*'
```

Code Complexity

Cyclomatic Complexity 1/2

Cyclomatic Complexity (`CCN`): is a software metric used to indicate the complexity of a program. It is a quantitative measure of the number of linearly independent paths through a program source code

It was originally intended “to identify software modules that will be difficult to test or maintain”

Thomas J. McCabe, "A Complexity Measure", IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 1976

Cyclomatic Complexity



CCN = 3

Cyclomatic Complexity Analyzer - `lyzard`

CC	Risk Evaluation
1-10	a simple program, *without much risk*
11-20	more complex, *moderate risk*
21-50	complex, *high risk*
$>$ **50**	untestable program, *very high risk*

CC	Guidelines
1-5	The routine is probably fine
6-10	Start to think about ways to simplify the routine
$>$ **10**	Break part of the routine

`blog.feabhas.com/2018/07/code-quality-cyclomatic-complexity`

Cyclomatic Complexity Analyzer - lyzard

Lizard is an extensible Cyclomatic Complexity Analyzer for many programming languages including C/C++

```
$lizard my_project/
==============================================================
NLOC    CCN  token  param    function@line@file
--------------------------------------------------------------
10      2     29      2    start_new_player@26@./html_game.c
6       1      3      0    set_shutdown_flag@449@./httpd.c
24      3     61      1    server_main@454@./httpd.c
--------------------------------------------------------------
```

- CCN: cyclomatic complexity (should not exceed a threshold)
- NLOC: lines of code without comments
- token: Number of conditional statements
- param: Parameter count of functions

Risk: Lizard: 15, OCLint: 10

Cognitive Complexity 1/3

Cognitive complexity has been introduced to address the weak points of *cyclomatic complexity*

- Cyclomatic complexity has been formulated in a Fortran environment. It doesn't include modern language structures like try/catch, and lambdas
- It doesn't take into account the complexity of a class as a whole

Cognitive complexity has been formulated to address modern language structures, and to produce values that are meaningful at the class and application levels. More importantly, it aims to *measure the cognitive effort required to understand the program flows*

Cognitive Complexity - A new way of measuring understandability

Cognitive Complexity 2/3

Cyclomatic complexity issues:

```
int sumOfPrimes(int max) {                         // +1
    int total = 0;
    OUT: for (int i = 1; i <= max; ++i) { // +1
        for (int j = 2; j < i; ++j) {      // +1
            if (i % j == 0) {              // +1
                continue OUT;
            }
        }
        total += i;
    }
    return total;
}                     // Cyclomatic Complexity 4
```

```
String getWords(int number) { // +1
    switch (number) {
        case 1:                // +1
            return "one";
        case 2:                // +1
            return "a couple";
        case 3:                // +1
            return "a few";
        default:
            return "lots";
    }
}          // Cyclomatic Complexity 4
```

Cognitive Complexity 3/3

```
int sumOfPrimes(int max) {
    int total = 0;
    OUT: for (int i = 1; i <= max; ++i) { // +1
        for (int j = 2; j < i; ++j) {     // +2
            if (i % j == 0) {             // +3
                continue OUT;             // +1
            }
        }
        total += i;
    }
    return total;
}                      // Cognitive Complexity: 7
```

```
String getWords(int number) {
    switch (number) {          // +1
        case 1:
            return "one";
        case 2:
            return "a couple";
        case 3:
            return "a few";
        default:
            return "lots";
    }
}          // Cognitive Complexity: 1
```